Wednesday, October 23, 2013


Overview

Monopoly power comes from a firm's ability to set prices. This ability is dictated by the shape of the demand curve facing that firm. If the firm faces a downward sloping demand curve, it is no longer a price taker but rather a price setter. In our perfect competition model, we assume there exist multiple participants, and because there are so many participants, the slice of the demand curve each firm sees is but a flat line. These firms are price takers.
There is a medium between monopoly and perfect competition in which only a few firms exist in a market. None of these firms faces the entire demand curve in the way a monopolist would, but each does have some power to set prices. A small collection of firms who dominate a market is called an oligopoly. A duopoly is a special case of an oligopoly, in which only two firms exist.
Duopolies
We will begin our discussion with an investigation of duopolies. For the following duopoly examples, we will assume the following:
  1. The two firms produce homogeneous and indistinguishable goods.
  2. There are no other firms in the market who produce the same or substitute goods.
  3. No other firms can or will enter the market.
  4. Collusive behavior is prohibited. Firms cannot act together to form a cartel.
  5. There exists one market for the produced goods.

Cournot Duopoly

In 1838, Augustin Cournot introduced a simple model of duopolies that remains the standard model for oligopolistic competition. In addition to the assumptions stated above, the Cournot duopoly model relies on the following:
  1. Each firm chooses a quantity to produce.
  2. All firms make this choice simultaneously.
  3. The model is restricted to a one-stage game. Firms choose their quantities only once.
  4. The cost structures of the firms are public information.
In the Cournot model, the strategic variable is the output quantity. Each firm decides how much of a good to produce. Both firms know the market demand curve, and each firm knows the cost structures of the other firm. The essence of the model is this: each firm takes the other firm's choice of output level as fixed and then sets its own production quantities.
The best way to explain the Cournot model is by walking through examples. Before we begin, we will define the reaction curve, the key to understanding the Cournot model (and elementary game theory as well).
A reaction curve for Firm 1 is a function Q 1 *() that takes as input the quantity produced by Firm 2 and returns the optimal output for Firm 1 given Firm 2's production decisions. In other words, Q 1 *(Q 2) is Firm 1's best response to Firm 2's choice of Q 2 . Likewise, Q 2 *(Q 1) is Firm 2's best response to Firm 1's choice of Q 1 .
Let's assume the two firms face a single market demand curve as follows:
Q = 100 - P
where P is the single market price and Q is the total quantity of output in the market. For simplicity's sake, let's assume that both firms face cost structures as follows:
MC_1 = 10
MC_2 = 12
Given this market demand curve and cost structure, we want to find the reaction curve for Firm 1. In the Cournot model, we assume Q 2 is fixed and proceed. Firm 1's reaction curve will satisfy its profit maximizing condition, MR = MC . In order to find Firm 1's marginal revenue, we first determine its total revenue, which can be described as follows
Total Revenue = P * Q1 = (100 - Q) * Q1
= (100 - (Q1 + Q2)) * Q1
= 100Q1 - Q1 ^ 2 - Q2 * Q1
The marginal revenue is simply the first derivative of the total revenue with respect to Q 1 (recall that we assume Q 2 is fixed). The marginal revenue for Firm 1 is thus:
MR1 = 100 - 2 * Q1 - Q2\
Imposing the profit maximizing condition of MR = MC , we conclude that Firm 1's reaction curve is:
100 - 2 * Q1* - Q2 = 10 => Q1* = 45 - Q2/2
That is, for every choice of Q 2 , Q 1 * is Firm 1's optimal choice of output. We can perform analogous analysis for Firm 2 (which differs only in that its marginal costs are 12 rather than 10) to determine its reaction curve, but we leave the process as a simple exercise for the reader. We find Firm 2's reaction curve to be:
Q2* = 44 - Q1/2
The solution to the Cournot model lies at the intersection of the two reaction curves. We solve now for Q 1 * . Note that we substitute Q 2 * for Q 2 because we are looking for a point which lies on Firm 2's reaction curve as well.
Q1* = 45 - Q2*/2 = 45 - (44 - Q1*/2)/2
= 45 - 22 + Q1*/4
= 23 + Q1*/4
=> Q1* = 92/3
By the same logic, we find:
Q2* = 86/3
Again, we leave the actual computation of Q 2 * as an exercise for the reader. Note that Q 1 * and Q 2 * differ due to the difference in marginal costs. In a perfectly competitive market, only firms with the lowest marginal cost would survive. In this case, however, Firm 2 still produces a significant quantity of goods, even though its marginal cost is 20% higher than Firm 1's.
An equilibrium cannot occur at a point not in the intersection of the two reaction curves. If such an equilibrium existed, at least one firm would not be on its reaction curve and would therefore not be playing its optimal strategy. It has incentive to move elsewhere, thus invalidating the equilibrium.
The Cournot equilibrium is a best response made in reaction to a best response and, by definition, is therefore a Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, the Cournot model does not describe the dynamics behind reaching equilibrium from a non-equilibrium state. If the two firms began out of equilibrium, at least one would have an incentive to move, thus violating our assumption that the quantities chosen are fixed. Rest assured that for the examples we have seen, the firms would tend towards equilibrium. However, we would require more advanced mathematics to adequately model this movement.

Stackelberg duopoly

The Stackelberg duopoly model of duopolies is very similar to the Cournot model. Like the Cournot model, the firms choose the quantities they produce. In the Stackelberg model, however, the firms do not move simultaneously. One firm holds the privilege to choose production quantities before the other. The assumptions underlying the Stackelberg model are as follows:
  1. Each firm chooses a quantity to produce.
  2. A firm chooses before the other in an observable manner.
  3. The model is restricted to a one-stage game. Firms choose their quantities only once.
To illustrate the Stackelberg model, let's walk through an example. Assume Firm 1 is the first mover with Firm 2 reacting to Firm 1's decision. We assume a market demand curve of:
Q = 90 - P
Furthermore, we assume all marginal costs are zero, that is:
MC = MC1 = MC2 = 0
We calculate Firm 2's reaction curve in the same way we did for the Cournot Model. Verify that Firm 2's reaction curve is:
Q2* = 45 - Q1/2
To calculate Firm 1's optimal quantity, we look at Firm 1's total revenues.
Firm 1's Total Revenue = P * Q1 = (90 - Q1 - Q2) * Q1
= 90 * Q1 - Q1 ^ 2 - Q2 * Q1
However, Firm 1 is not forced to assume Firm 2's quantity is fixed. In fact, Firm 1 knows that Firm 2 will act along its reaction curve which varies with Q 1 . Firm 2's quantity very much relies on Firm 1's choice of quantity. Firm 1's Total Revenue can thus be rewritten as a function of Q 1 :
R1 = 90 * Q1 - Q1 ^2 - Q1 * (45 - Q1/2)
Marginal revenue for firm 1 is thus:
MR1 = 90 - 2 * Q1 - 45 + Q1
= 45 - Q1
When we impose the profit maximizing condition (MR = MC) , we find:
Q1 = 45
Solving for Q 2 , we find:
Q2 = 22.5
Although much of the logic behind the Stackelberg model is used in the Cournot model, the two outcomes are radically different: being the first to announce creates a credible threat. In the Cournot model, both firms make their choices simultaneously and have no communication beforehand. In the Stackelberg model, Firm 1 not only announces first, but Firm 2 knows that when Firm 1 announces, Firm 1's actions are credible and fixed. This demonstrates how a slight change in the flow of information can drastically impact the outcome of a market.

Bertrand Duopoly

The Bertrand duopoly Model, developed in the late nineteenth century by French economist Joseph Bertrand, changes the choice of strategic variables. In the Bertrand model, rather than choosing how much to produce, each firm chooses the price at which to sell its goods.
  1. Rather than choosing quantities, the firms choose the price at which they sell the good.
  2. All firms make this choice simultaneously.
  3. Firms have identical cost structures.
  4. The model is restricted to a one-stage game. Firms choose their prices only once.
Although the setup of the Bertrand Model differs from the Cournot model only in the strategic variable, the two models yield surprisingly different results. Whereas the Cournot model yields equilibriums that fall somewhere in between the monopolistic outcome and the free market outcome, the Bertrand model simply reduces to the competitive equilibrium, where profits are zero. Rather than take you through a series of convoluted equations to derive this result, we will simply show there could be no other outcome.
The Bertrand equilibrium is simply the no profit equilibrium. First, we will demonstrate that the Bertrand outcome is indeed an equilibrium. Imagine a market in which two identical firms sell at market price P, the competitive price at which neither firm earns profits. Implicit in our argument is our assumption that at equal price, each firm will sell to half the market. If Firm 1 were to raise its price above the market price P, Firm 1 would lose all its sales to Firm 2 and would have to exit the market. If Firm 1 were to lower its price below P, it would be operating below cost and therefore at a loss overall. At the competitive outcome, Firm 1 cannot increase profits by changing its price in either direction. By the same logic, Firm 2 has no incentive to change prices. Therefore, the no profit outcome is an equilibrium, in fact a Nash equilibrium, in the Bertrand model.
We now demonstrate uniqueness of the Bertrand equilibrium. Naturally, there can be no equilibrium where profits are negative. In this case, all firms would operate at a loss and exit the market. It remains to be shown that there is no equilibrium where profits are positive. Imagine a market in which two identical firms sell at market price P, which is greater than cost. If Firm 1 were to raise its price above the market price P, Firm 1 would lose all its sales to Firm 2. However, if Firm 1 were to lower its price ever so slightly below P (while still remaining above MC), it would capture the entire market at a profit. Firm 2 is faced with the same incentives, so Firm 1 and Firm 2 would undercut each other until profits are driven to zero. Therefore no equilibrium exists when profits are positive in the Bertrand model.

Collusion

You may ask yourself why firms don't agree to work together to maximize profits for all rather than competing amongst themselves. In fact, we will show that firms do benefit when cooperating to maximize profits.
Assume both Firm 1 and Firm 2 face the same total market demand curve:
Q = 90 - P
where P is the market price and Q is the total output from both Firm 1 and Firm 2. Furthermore, assume that all marginal costs are zero, that is:
MC = MC1 = MC2 = 0
Verify that the reaction curves according to the Cournot model can be described as:
Q1* = 45 - Q2/2
Q2* = 45 - Q1/2
Solving the system of equations, we find:
Cournot Equilibrium: Q1* = Q2* = 30
Each firm produces 30 units for a total of 60 units in the market place. P is then 30 (recall P = 90 - Q ). Because MC = 0 for both firms, the profit for each firm is simply 900 for a total profit of 1,800 in the market.
However, if the two firms were to collude and act as a monopoly, they would act differently. The demand curve and the marginal costs remain the same. They would act together to solve for the total profit maximizing quantity Q . Revenues in this market can be described as:
Total Revenue = P * Q = (90 - Q) * Q
= 90 * Q - Q^2
Marginal Revenue is therefore:
MR = 90 - 2 * Q
Imposing the profit maximizing condition (MR = MC) , we conclude:
Q = 45
Each firm now produces 22.5 units for a total of 45 in the market. The market price P is therefore 45. Each firm makes a profit of 1,012.5 for a total profit of 2,025.
Notice that the Cournot equilibrium is much better for the firms than perfect competition (under which no one makes any profits) but worse than the collusive outcome. Also, the total quantity supplied is lowest for the collusive outcome and highest for the perfectly competitive case. Because the collusive outcome is more socially inefficient than the competitive oligopoly outcome, the government restricts collusion through anti-trust laws.

Extension of the Cournot Model

We now extend the Cournot Model of duopolies to an oligopoly where n firms exist. Assume the following:
  1. Each firm chooses a quantity to produce.
  2. All firms make this choice simultaneously.
  3. The model is restricted to a one-stage game. Firms choose their quantities only once.
  4. All information is public.
Recall that in the Cournot model, the strategic variable is the output quantity. Each firm decides how much of a good to produce. All firms know the market demand curve, and each firm knows the cost structures of the other firms. The essence of the model: each firm takes the other firms' choice of output level as fixed and then sets its own production quantities.
Let's walk through an example. Assume all firms face a single market demand curve as follows:
Q = 100 - P
where P is the single market price and Q is the total quantity of output in the market. For simplicity's sake, let's assume that all firms face the same cost structure as follows:
MC_i = 10 for all firms I
Given this market demand curve and cost structure, we want to find the reaction curve for Firm 1. In the Cournot model, we assume Q i is fixed for all firms i not equal to 1. Firm 1's reaction curve will satisfy its profit maximizing condition, MR1 = MC1 . In order to find Firm 1's marginal revenue, we first determine its total revenue, which can be described as follows
Total Revenue = P * Q1 = (100 - Q) * Q1
= (100 - (Q1 + Q2 +...+ Qn)) * Q1
= 100 * Q1 - Q1 ^ 2 - (Q2 +...+ Qn)* Q1
The marginal revenue is simply the first derivative of the total revenue with respect to Q 1 (recall that we assume Q i for i not equal to 1 is fixed). The marginal revenue for firm 1 is thus:
MR1 = 100 - 2 * Q1 - (Q2 +...+ Qn)
Imposing the profit maximizing condition of MR = MC , we conclude that Firm 1's reaction curve is:
100 - 2 * Q1* - (Q2 +...+ Qn) = 10
=> Q1* = 45 - (Q2 +...+ Qn)/2
Q 1 * is Firm 1's optimal choice of output for all choices of Q 2 to Q n . We can perform analogous analysis for Firms 2 through n (which are identical to firm 1) to determine their reaction curves. Because the firms are identical and because no firm has a strategic advantage over the others (as in the Stackelberg model), we can safely assume all would output the same quantity. Set Q 1 * = Q 2 * = ... = Q n * . Substituting, we can solve for Q 1 * .
Q1* = 45 - (Q1*)*(n-1)/2
=> Q1* ((2 + n - 1)/2) = 45
=> Q1* = 90/(1+n)
By symmetry, we conclude:
Qi* = 90/(1+n) for all firms I
In our model of perfect competition, we know that the total market output Q = 90 , the zero profit quantity. In the n firm case, Q is simply the sum of all Q i * . Because all Q i * are equal due to symmetry:
Q = n * 90/(1+n)
As n gets larger, Q gets closer to 90, the perfect competition output. The limit of Q as n approaches infinity is 90 as expected. Extending the Cournot model to the n firm case gives us some confidence in our model of perfect competition. As the number of firms grow, the total market quantity supplied approaches the socially optimal quantity.

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Welcome to Economics -


Welcome to Economics - AS Micro-economics
1) Stating that taxes should be raised to help the poor is an example of:
a) A positive economic statement
b) A normative economic statement
c) A testable fact
d) An objective economic statement

2) A PPF can indicate all of the following, except:
a) The effect of an increase in the use of new technology
b) The opportunity cost of increasing production of one good
c) Consumer preferences
d) Economic growth

3) A demand curve can shift to the right by all of the following, except:
a) A fall in price of the good
b) A fall in the price of a complement
c) A rise in the price of a substitute
d) An increased preference for the good

4) A supply curve can shift to the left due to all of the following, except:
a An increase in VAT
b) A reduced subsidy
c) An increase in wages
d) An increase in the use of new technology

5) The price of tomatoes is currently 50p per kilo, and a shop currently sells 1000 kilos per week. It then reduces price to 40p and finds that it now sells 1400 kilos per week. Its PED is:
a) - 0.5
b) + 0.5
c) - 2.0
d) + 2.0

6) The price of tomatoes falls from 50p to 40p, and tomato growers supply the same amount to shops. The PES is: 
a) Zero
b) Infinite
c) Equal to one
d) Impossible to calculate

7) When the price of good X rises the demand for good Y also rises. X and Y are:
a) Inferior goods
b) Complements
c) Substitutes
d) Normal goods

8) When the price of good A rises the demand for good B falls, A and B are:
a) Inferior goods
b) Complements
c) Substitutes
d) Normal goods

9) YED for an inferior good is always:
a) Negative
b) Positive
c) > 1
d) < 1

10) The effect of a fall in the price of a normal good is to:
a) Increase producer surplus
b) Increase consumer surplus
c) Decrease consumer surplus
d) Reduce demand for a complementary good

11) If new firms enter a market, but demand stays the same, it can be predicted that:
a) Consumer surplus will fall
b) Prices are likely to fall
c) There will be reduced economic welfare
d) Prices are likely to rise

12) If an indirect tax is imposed on a good which has a very elastic PED, the burden, or incidence, of the tax is:
a) Mainly on the consumer
b) Mainly on the producer
c) Equally shared
d) All on the producer

13) The effect of a subsidy is to:
a) Shift the supply curve downwards and to the right
b) Shift the supply curve upwards and to the left
c) Reduce demand
d) Reduce consumer surplus

14) If the government imposes a minimum price below the existing market price it will:
a) Cause supply to shift to the left
b) Cause demand to contract
c) Cause supply to contract
d) Have no effect

15) If the government imposes a maximum price below the existing market price it will:
a) Cause supply to expand
b) Cause demand to contract
c) Create a shortage
d) Create a surplus

16) A market can fail in all of the following cases, except:
a) Under-supply of public goods
b) Under-supply of merit goods
c) Not labelling foods which contain unhealthy ingredients
d) Creating incentives through the price mechanism

17) The price mechanism works mainly through:
a) Incentives and signalling
b) Taxes and subsidies
c) Minimum and maximum prices
d) Government spending and welfare benefits

18) Public goods will be under-supplied in a market economy because public goods exhibit:
a) Reject-ability
b) Diminish-ability
c) Non-excludability
d) Zero opportunity cost

19) Road congestion can be reduced by all of the following, except:
a) Subsidising car production
b) Taxing car ownership
c) Pricing road-space
d) Improving public transport

20) Carbon trading helps reduce carbon emissions mainly because:
a) Low polluters buy excess permits to pollute
b) High polluters are fined by the carbon regulator
c) Information failure is increased
d) External costs are internalised by the polluter
21) All of the following could reduce waste, except:
a) Introducing a landfill tax
b) Providing less information
c) Taxing rubbish bags
d) Reducing packaging on products

22) It is reasonable to expect students or their families to contribute to their tuition fees at university because:
a) It will provide the universities with more revenue
b) The State should not contribute to their fees
c) The cost of education continuously rises
d) The average university student derives private benefit

23) Government intervention to correct a market failure will be inefficient if:
a) The cost of implementation is greater than the benefit
b) It causes unemployment
c) Businesses have to close
d) Anyone loses from their actions

24) Highly unstable agricultural prices are often caused by:
a) Governments buying up stock
b) The price mechanism working effectively
c) Supply shocks like diseases
d) Highly elastic demand and supply

25) Buffer stocks can be criticised for all of the following, except:
a) They need a good harvest to start
b) Not all goods can be stored
c) They cost money to manage
d) They can help stabilise prices

Monopoly & economic efficiency





Monopoly & economic efficiency

Author: Geoff Riley  Last updated: Sunday 23 September, 2012
The standard case against monopolistic businesses is no longer straightforward. Markets are changing all of the time and so are the conditions in which businesses must operate regardless of whether they have any noticeable market power.
When a company lowers its price, is that genuine competition that benefits consumers or an attempt to monopolise the market? If a company gains market share, is that a result of improved efficiency or merely a competitive threat in the long run? When a company develops innovative products that competitors cannot easily duplicate, is that monopolization? If several companies look to limit excess output because of difficult trading conditions – is this necessarily collusive behaviour that competition policy should look to stop?
The economic case against monopoly

X Inefficiencies under Monopoly

  • The lack of competition may give a monopolist less incentive to invest in new ideas. Even if the monopolist benefits from economies of scale, they have little incentive to control their costs and 'X' inefficiencies will mean that there will be no real cost savings compared to a competitive market.
  • A competitive industry will produce in the long run where market demand = market supply. Consider the diagrams below. Equilibrium output and price is at Q1 and Pcomp on the left hand diagram and Pcomp and Q1 on the right hand diagram. At this point, Price = MC and the industry meets the conditions for allocative efficiency.
  • If the industry is taken over by a monopolist the profit-maximising point (MC=MR) is at price Pmon and output Q2. The monopolist is able to charge a higher price restrict total output and thereby reduce welfare because the rise in price to Pmon reduces consumer surplus
  • Some of this reduction in welfare is a pure transfer to the producer through higher profits, but some of the loss is not reassigned to any other agent. This is known as the deadweight welfare loss or the social cost of monopoly and is equal to the area ABC.

A similar result is seen in the next diagram which makes the assumption of constant long-run average and marginal costs under both competition and monopoly. The deadweight loss of welfare under monopoly (whose profit maximising price is P1 and Q1) is shown by the triangle ABC. The competitive price and output is Pc and Qc respectively.

Potential Benefits from Monopoly

A high market concentration does not always signal the absence of competition; sometimes it can reflect the success of firms in providing better-quality products, more efficiently, than their rivals
One difficulty in assessing the welfare consequences of monopoly, duopoly or oligopoly lies in defining precisely what a market constitutes! In nearly every industry a market is segmented into different products, and globalization makes it difficult to gauge the degree of monopoly power.
What are the main advantages of a market dominated by a few sellers?

Economies of Scale

A monopolist might be better placed to exploit increasing returns to scale leasing to an equilibrium that gives a higher output and a lower price than under competitive conditions. This is illustrated in the next diagram, where we assume that the monopolist is able to drive marginal costs lower in the long run, finding an equilibrium output of Q2 and pricing below the competitive price.

Monopoly Profits, Research and Development and Dynamic Efficiency
  • Patents provide legal protection of an idea or process. Generic patents allow legal copying of a product.
  • As firms are able to earn abnormal profits in the long run there may be a faster rate of technological development that will reduce costs and produce better quality items for consumers.
  • Monopoly power can be good for innovation.  Despite the fact that the market leadership of firms like Microsoft, Toyota, GlaxoSmithKline and Sony is often criticised, investment in research and development can be beneficial to society because they expand the technological frontier and open new ways to prosperity. Many innovations are developed by firms with patents on ‘leading-edge’ technologies.
Baumol – Oligopoly and Innovation
William Baumol an economist from Princeton University wrote “The Free Market Innovation Machine” in which he argued that the structure that fosters productive innovation best is oligopoly. The Baumol hypothesis is that oligopolists compete by making their products differ slightly from their rivals. Highly innovative firms are often quick to license new technology or to become members of technology-sharing consortia.

Natural Monopoly

There are several interpretations of what a natural monopoly us
  1. It occurs when one large business can supply the entire market at a lower price than two or more smaller ones
  2. A natural monopoly is a situation in which there cannot be more than one efficient provider of a good. In this situation, competition might actually increase costs and prices
  3. It is an industry where the minimum efficient scale is a large share of market demand such there is room for only one firm to fully exploit all of the available internal economies of scale
  4. An industry where the long run average cost curve falls continuously as output expands
  5. Private utilities are natural monopolies in local markets
The key point is that a natural monopoly is characterized by increasing returns to scale at all levels of output – thus the long run cost per unit (LRAC) will drift lower as production expands. LRAC is falling because long run marginal cost is below LRAC. This can be illustrated in the diagram above. There may be room only for one supplier to fully exploit economies of scale, reach the minimum efficient scale and achieve productive efficiency.

Because there is no single definition of a natural monopoly, none of the examples below are purely national monopolies – their cost structure does take them close to a common-sense interpretation:
  • British Telecom building and maintaining the UK telecommunications network for the broadband industry – especially the ‘final mile’ copper wiring from the local exchanges to each household
  • The Royal Mail’s postal distribution network – collection / sorting / delivery
  • Camelot operating the national network for the UK lottery
  • National Rail owning, maintaining and leasing out the UK rail network
  • National Grid, which owns and operates the National Grid high-voltage electricity transmission network in England and Wales. Since April 1, 2005 it also operates the electricity transmission network in Scotland. Owns and operates the gas transmission network (from terminals to distributors).
  • London Underground, Tyne and Wear Metro
Key point: A natural monopoly does not mean that there is only one business operating in the market or that only one firm can survive in the long run. Indeed there may be many smaller businesses operating profitably in smaller ‘niche’ segments of a market (however that is defined).
Possible conflicts between economic efficiency and economic welfare
It is often said that a natural monopoly raises difficult questions for competition policy because
  • On the one hand – it is more productively efficient for there to be one dominant provider of a national infrastructure e.g. a rail network or electricity generating system
  • Natural monopolies require enormous investment spending to maintain and improve the networks
  • Businesses monopoly power (huge barriers to entry) might be tempted to exploit that power by raising prices and making huge supernormal profits – damaging consumer welfare
The profit-maximizing price is P1 at an output of Q1. Price is well above the marginal cost of supply and high supernormal profits are made – but output is high too and there is still a sizeable amount of consumer surplus because of the internal economies of scale that have brought down the unit cost for all consumers. (We are ignoring the possibility of price discrimination here).

Options for competition policy in industries that resemble a natural monopoly
  1. Nationalization: Bringing some of these industries into state ownership
    1. Network Rail is a not-for-profit business (formerly Railtrack plc) – nationalized in 2001
    2. National Air Traffic Services – Owned by the UK government (49%); The Airline Group (42%) which is a consortium of British Airways, BMI, easyJet, Monarch Airlines, Thomas Cook Airlines, Thomsonfly and Virgin Atlantic; BAA (4%); and NATS employees (5%).
  2. Price controls by the regulatory agencies
    1. For many utilities, the government introduced industry regulators to oversee these businesses when they were privatized in the 1980s and early 1990s
    2. For many years utility businesses such as British Telecom and British Gas were subject to price capping– most of these have now finished although some remain – for more details – see this link
    3. On 26 November 2009 the water regulator Ofwat announced that water bills must be cut by an average of £3 a year per household over the next five years and that there must be an extra £1 billion investment by water companies
  1. Fines for anti-competitive behaviour: In 2008 the Microsoft computer software company was fined €1.68 billion by the European Competition Commission for pre-installing its browser, Internet Explorer, on computers running the Windows operating system. In December 2009, Microsoft agreed to allow consumers to choose their web browser on setup. Removing the pre-installation of the software will mean that more firms will be able to enter the market.
  2. Introducing competition into the industry -this has been a favoured policy
    1. Basically involves separating out infrastructure from the final service to the consumer – for example:
      1. British Telecom was eventually forced to open-up local telecom exchanges and allow rivals to install equipment (‘unbundling the local loop’) – who then sell services such as broadband to households – competitors pay BT an access charge designed to give BT a 10% rate of return from running the network.
      2. BAA: In March 2009 the UK Competition Commission required British Airports Authority to sell off three of its seven airports, starting with Gatwick and then Stansted
      3. National Rail runs the network – but train-operating companies have to bid for the franchise to run passenger services – and the industry regulator can take their franchise away if the quality of service isn’t good enough. The government took the East Coast line into public ownership in July 2009 following the financial problems facing National Express.
      4. Camelot has successfully bid to operate the National Lottery until 2017
SPEW
Here is a good way to remember some of the issues we have covered regarding monopoly, efficiency and economic welfare
Service - does the lack of competition affect the quality of service to consumers?
Prices - how high are prices compared to competitive / contestable market
Efficiency - productive, allocative and dynamic
Welfare - what are the overall welfare outcomes? Is there a net loss of welfare in markets dominated by businesses with monopoly power?
Acknowledged source: Ruth Tarrant

Case study: EU competition commission enforces price cap on mobile phone charges
The EU Competition Commission has enforced a price cap on the cost of sending text messages when abroad and has introduced a maximum charge for receiving and making a phone call. At a time when both external and internal economies of scale were lowering the unit costs of domestic phone calls, international roaming charges remained high and the Commission decided there was an exploitation of monopoly power.
The Commission has had to balance the desire for competition with the need to avoid over-regulation. Vodafone made a pre-emptive strike ahead of the likely regulation in roaming charges, by saying it would cut the cost of using other companies’ networks when abroad by at least 40 per cent; it has since announced an end to roaming charges.
Under the new limits there is a single tariff covering all 27 EU member states - bringing the maximum charge for making a call while abroad down to 37p per minute. Receiving calls now costs a maximum of 17p per minute. Sending a text message fro

Game theory is widely regarded as having its origins in the mid-nineteenth century with the publication in 1838 of Augustin Cournot's Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, in which he attempted explain the underlying rules governing the behaviour of duopolists. However, it was with the publication in 1944 of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour that the modern principles of game theory were formulated. Game theory has been widely applied to the behaviour of producers with a few or only one competitor.

Game Theory
Game theory is widely regarded as having its origins in the mid-nineteenth century with the publication in 1838 of Augustin Cournot's Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, in which he attempted explain the underlying rules governing the behaviour of duopolists. However, it was with the publication in 1944 of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour that the modern principles of game theory were formulated.  Game theory has been widely applied to the behaviour of producers with a few or only one competitor.
What is a game?
All games have the following:
  1. Rules, which govern conduct of the players
  2. Pay-offs, such as win, lose or draw
  3. Strategies, which influence the decision making process.
In applying game theory to the behaviour of firms we can suggest that firms face a number of strategic choices which govern their ability to achieve a desired pay-off, including:
Decisions on price and output, such as whether to:
  • Raise
  • Lower
  • Hold
Decisions on products, such as whether to:
  • Keep existing products
  • Develop new ones
Decisions on promoting products, such as whether to:
  • Spend more on advertising
  • Spend less
  • Keep spending constant
Firms could derive a range of possible pay-offs from their strategy choices, including:
  • More profits for shareholders
  • Greater market share
  • Improved chances of survival
  • Getting rid of a rival
Video
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple game which illustrates the choices facing oligopolies. As you read the scenarios, you can play the part of one of the prisoners.
The scenario
Robin and Tom are prisoners:
They have been arrested for a petty crime, of which there is good evidence of their guilt – if found guilty they will receive a 2 year sentence.
During the interview the police officer becomes suspicious that the two prisoners are also guilty of a serious crime, but is not sure he has any evidence.
Robin and Tom are placed in separate rooms and cannot communicate with each other. The police officer tries to get them to confess to the serious crime by offering them some options, with possible pay-offs.
The options
Each is told that if they both confess to the serious crime they will receive a sentence of 3 years. However, each is also told that if he confesses and his partner does not, then he will get a light sentence of 1 year, and his partner will get 10 years. They know that if they both deny the serious offence they are certain to be found guilty of the lesser offence, and will get a 2 year sentence.
The pay-off matrix 
Prisoner's dilemma
What would you do if you were one of them? Give an answer before you read on.
The dilemma is that their own 'pay-off' is wholly dependent on the behaviour of the other prisoner. To avoid the worse-case scenario (10 years), the safest option is to confess and get 3 years. If collusion is possible they can both agree to deny (and get 2 years), but there is a very strong incentive to cheat because, if one denies and the other confesses, the best outcome of all is possible - that is 1 year. Fearing that the other may cheat, the safest option is to confess.
Types of strategy
Maximax
A maximax strategy is one where the player attempts to earn the maximum possible benefit available. This means they will prefer the alternative which includes the chance of achieving the best possible outcome – even if a highly unfavourable outcome is possible.
This strategy, often referred to as the best of the best is often seen as ‘naive’ and overly optimistic strategy, in that it assumes a highly favourable environment for decision making.
The best pay-off for Robin from confessing is 1 year (with Tom denying), and the best pay-off from denying is 2 years (with Tom denying) - so the best of the best is to confess (I year).
Maximin
A maximin strategy is where a player chooses the best of the worst pay-off. This is commonly chosen when a player cannot rely on the other party to keep any agreement that has been made - for example, to deny. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, the worst pay-off to Robin from confessing is to get 3 years (with Tom confessing), and the worst pay-off from denying is 10 years (with Tom confessing) - therefore the best of the worst is to confess.
In this case, both the maximin and maximax strategies would be to confess. When this occurs, it is said to be the dominant strategy.
Dominant strategy
A dominant strategy is the best outcome irrespective of what the other player chooses, in this case it is for each player to confess - both the optimistic maximax and pessimistic maximin lead to the same decision being taken.
How does this relate to a firm's behaviour?
In general, game theory suggests that firms are unlikely to trust each other, even if they collude and come to an agreement such as raising price together.
Consider the hypothetical example of two Airlines and return ticket prices to New York.
Airline pricing case
In this case, for both Airlines, the aggressive maximax strategy is £140m from a low price and £120m from a high price, so a low price gives the maximax pay-off.
In terms of the pessimistic maximin strategy, the worst outcome from a low price is £100m, and from a high price is £70m - hence a low price provides the best of the worst outcomes.
Again, lowering price is the dominant strategy, and the only way to increase the pay-off would be to collude and increase price together. Of course, this requires an agreement, and collusion, and this creates two further risks - one of the airlines reneges on the agreement and 'rats', and the competition authorities investigate the airlines, and impose a penalty.

Nash equilibrium

Nash equilibrium, named after Nobel winning economist, John Nash, is a solution to a game involving two or more players who want the best outcome for themselves and must take the actions of others into account. When Nash equilibrium is reached, players cannot improve their payoff by independently changing their strategy. This means that it is the best strategy assuming the other has chosen a strategy and will not change it. For example, in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, confessing is a Nash equilibrium because it is the best oputcome, taking into account the likely actions of others.
Implications
Game Theory provides many insights into the behaviour of oligopolists. For example, it indicates that generating rules for behaviour may take some of the risks out of competition, such as:
  1. Employing a simple cost-plus pricing method which is shared by all participants. This would work well in situations where oligopolists share similar or identical costs, such as with petrol retailing.
  2. Implicitly agreeing a 'price leader' with other firms as followers. In the Airline example, firm A may lead and raise price, with B passively following suit. In this case, both would generate revenues of £120.
  3. Supermarkets implicitly agreeing some lines where price cutting will take place, such as bread or baked beans, but keeping price constant for most lines.
  4. Generally keeping prices stable (sticky) to avoid price retaliation.

Monopoly A pure monopoly is a single supplier in a market. For the purposes of regulation, monopoly power exists when a single firm controls 25% or more of a particular market. Formation of monopolies

Monopoly

A pure monopoly is a single supplier in a market. For the purposes of regulation, monopoly power exists when a single firm controls 25% or more of a particular market.
Formation of monopolies
Monopolies can form for a variety of reasons, including the following:
  1. If a firm has exclusive ownership of a scarce resource, such as Microsoft owning the Windows operating system brand, it has monopoly power over this resource and is the only firm that can exploit it.
  2. Governments may grant a firm monopoly status, such as with the Post Office, which was given monopoly status by Oliver Cromwell in 1654. The Royal Mail Group finally lost its monopoly status in 2006, when the market was opened up to competition.
  3. Producers may have patents over designs, or copyright over ideas, characters, images, sounds or names, giving them exclusive rights to sell a good or service, such as a song writer having a monopoly over their own material.
  4. A monopoly could be created following the merger of two or more firms. Given that this will reduce competition, such mergers are subject to close regulation and may be prevented if the two firms gain a combined market share of 25% or more.
Key characteristics
  1. Monopolies can maintain super-normal profits in the long run. As with all firms, profits are maximised when MC = MR. In general, the level of profit depends upon the degree of competition in the market, which for a pure monopoly is zero. At profit maximisation, MC = MR, and output is Q and price P. Given that price (AR) is above ATC at Q, supernormal profits are possible (area PABC).
Super-normal profits
  1. With no close substitutes, the monopolist can derive super-normal profits, area PABC.
  2. A monopolist with no substitutes would be able to derive the greatest monopoly power.
Video
Evaluation of monopolies
The advantages of monopolies
Monopolies can be defended on the following grounds:
  1. They can benefit from economies of scale, and may be ‘natural’ monopolies, so it may be argued that it is best for them to remain monopolies to avoid the wasteful duplication of infrastructure that would happen if new firms were encouraged to build their own infrastructure.
  2. Domestic monopolies can become dominant in their own territory and then penetrate overseas markets, earning a country valuable export revenues. This is certainly the case with Microsoft.
  3. According to Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, inefficient firms, including monopolies, would eventually be replaced by more efficient and effective firms through a process called creative destruction.
  4. It has been consistently argued by some economists that monopoly power is required to generate dynamic efficiency, that is, technological progressiveness. This is because:
    1. High profit levels boost investment in R&D.
    2. Innovation is more likely with large enterprises and this innovation can lead to lower costs than in competitive markets.
    3. A firm needs a dominant position to bear the risks associated with innovation.
    4. Firms need to be able to protect their intellectual property by establishing barriers to entry; otherwise, there will be a free rider problem.
    5. Why spend large sums on R&D if ideas or designs are instantly copied by rivals who have not allocated funds to R&D?
    6. However, monopolies are protected from competition by barriers to entry and this will generate high levels of supernormal profits.
    7. If some of these profits are invested in new technology, costs are reduced via process innovation. This makes the monopolist’s supply curve to the right of the industry supply curve. The result is lower price and higher output in the long run.
The disadvantages of monopoly to the consumer
Monopolies can be criticised because of their potential negative effects on the consumer, including:
  1. Restricting output onto the market.
  2. Charging a higher price than in a more competitive market.
  3. Reducing consumer surplus and economic welfare.
  4. Restricting choice for consumers.
  5. Reducing consumer sovereignty.
Higher prices
The traditional view of monopoly stresses the costs to society associated with higher prices. Because of the lack of competition, the monopolist can charge a higher price (P1) than in a more competitive market (at P).
The area of economic welfare under perfect competition is E, F, B. The loss of consumer surplus if the market is taken over by a monopoly is P P1 A B. The new area of producer surplus, at the higher price P1, is E, P1, A, C. Thus,  the overall (net) loss of economic welfare is area A B C.
The area of deadweight loss for a monopolist can also be shown in a more simple form, comparing perfect competition with monopoly.
Welfare loss
Alternative diagram
The following diagram assumes that average cost is constant, and equal to marginal cost (ATC = MC).Under perfect competition, equilibrium price and output is at P and Q. If the market is controlled by a single firm, equilibrium for the firm is where MC = MR, at P1 and Q1. Under perfect competition, the area representing economic welfare is P, F and A, but under monopoly the area of welfare is P, F, C, B. Therefore, the deadweight loss is the area B, C, A.
Deadweight loss
The wider and external costs of monopolies
Monopolies can also lead to:
  1. A less competitive economy in the global market-place.
  2. A less efficient economy.
    1. Less productively efficient
    2. Less allocatively efficient
  3. The economy is also likely to suffer from ‘X’ inefficiency, which is the loss of management efficiency associated with markets where competition is limited or absent.
  4. Less employment in the economy, as higher prices lead to lower output and les need to employ labour.
Remedies
Monopoly power can be controlled, or reduced, in several ways, including price controls and prohibiting mergers.
It is widely believed that the costs to society arising from the existence of monopolies and monopoly power are greater than the benefits and that monopolies should be regulated.
Options available to regulators include:
  1. Regulators can set price controls and formulae, often called price capping. This means forcing the monopolist to charge a price, often below profit maximising price. For example, in the UK the RPI – ‘X’ formula has been widely used to regulate the prices of the privatised utilities. In the formula, the RPI (Retail Price Index) represents the current inflation rate and ‘X’ is a figure which is set at the expected efficiency gain, which the regulator believes would have existed in a competitive market. However, there is a dilemma with price controls because price-capping results in lower prices, but lower prices also deter entry into the market. The formula for water is RPI + K + U, where K is the price limit, and U is any unused 'credit' from previous years. For example, if K is 3% in 2010, but a water company only 'uses' 2%, it can add on the unused 1% to K in 2011. Regulators may remove price caps if they judge that competition in the market has increased sufficiently, as in the case of OFCOM who removed BT's price cap in 2006.
  2. An alternative to price-cap regulation is rate-of-return regulation. Rate of return regulation, which was developed in the USA, is a method of regulating the average price of private or privatised public utilities, such as water, electricity and gas supply. The system, which employs accounting rules for the calculation of operating costs, allows firms to cover these costs, and earn a ‘fair’ rate of return on capital invested. The ‘fair’ rate is based on typical rates of return which might be expected in a competitive market.
  3. Regulators can prevent mergers or acquisitions, or set conditions for successful mergers.
  4. Breaking-up the monopoly, such as forcing Microsoft to split into two separate businesses – one for the operating system and one for software sales. In 2004, the UK telecom's regulator Ofcom recommended that BT is split into two businesses: retail and wholesale.
  5. A less popular option would be to bring the monopoly under public control, in other words to nationalise it.
  6. Regulators can also force firms to unbundle their products and open-up their infrastructure. Bundling means selling a number of products together in a single bundle. For example, Microsoft sells PowerPoint, Access, Excel and Word as one product rather than separate ones. Unbundling makes it easier for firms to enter the market, as in the case of UK telecoms, when BT was forced to apply local loop unbundling, which enabled new broadband operators to enter the market.
  7. Regulators can use yardstick competition, such as setting punctuality targets for train operators based on the highly efficient Bullet trains of Japan.
  8. It is also possible to split up a service into regional sections to compare the performance of one region against another. In the UK, this is applied  to both water supply and rail services.

Sunday, October 20, 2013

Economics in practice